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Abstract 
This paper provides a review and critical discussion of indicators, which attempt to 
combine the measurement of sustainability with that of well-being. It starts with some 
commonly agreed definitions of sustainability, showing how most well-being indicators 
tell us little if anything at all about this issue. Sustainability is most commonly defined 
in economics as non-declining utility or well-being over time. Yet, due to its future 
orientation, most indicators of sustainability such as Genuine Savings (GS) have merely 
focused on the capacity to provide utility in the future, but have not included the 
measurement of current well-being. Indicators of well-being such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), on the other hand, have typically failed to account for 
sustainability in their measurement of current well-being. The paper then critically 
reviews the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and the Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI), which are the most prominent examples of an indicator, which …/… 
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attempts to fully integrate the measurement of welfare with that of sustainability into 
one single indicator. Such an integration, whilst seemingly attractive, is rendered 
difficult by the fact that what contributes to current well-being need not contribute at all 
or in the same way to sustainability and vice versa. We also review various proposals of 
extending a welfare indicator, namely the HDI, with sustainability considerations 
without full integration of both concepts. All of these proposals suffer from a range of 
fundamental conceptual problems. As one possible alternative, we propose a 
combination of the HDI and GS, which holds great promise for an assessment of well-
being and its sustainability, particularly in developing countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Most indicators of well-being ignore sustainability and most indicators of sustainability 
ignore (current) well-being. A prominent example for the former is the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI), whereas the World 
Bank’s Genuine Savings (GS) is characteristic of the latter. This paper provides a 
critical assessment of those efforts, which have tried to integrate both concepts into one 
single indicator or have combined the measurement of both without full integration. 
Before addressing these measures, let us define what we mean by well-being and 
sustainability. Well-being often comes under the name welfare or utility and we will use 
all three terms interchangeably here. In spite of its common use in economics and other 
social sciences, it is not easily defined in a concrete sense. We will simply understand 
well-being, welfare or utility as the satisfaction of human preferences. The better human 
preferences are satisfied the greater is well-being. From our definition it becomes clear 
that income is by far not the only relevant item creating well-being. Even if we exclude 
very personal determinants of well-being such as friendship, love and the like, which 
policy cannot influence, we end up with a great variety of welfare-relevant factors. 
Health, education, freedom, autonomy, recreation, experience of nature, to mention but 
a few, are all examples of items that promote welfare. What contributes to welfare and 
by how much is of course to some extent open to subjective judgement. 
Sustainability is sometimes narrowly defined in physical terms as environmental 
sustainability, where it refers to the maintenance of certain environmental functions. 
Economists, however, prefer a broader definition that is not confined to environmental 
sustainability. Definitions slightly differ, but the most common one sees sustainability as 
the requirement to maintain the capacity to provide non-declining well-being over time. 
Contrary to well-being itself, which has an orientation towards the presence, sustainability 
is therefore a future-oriented concept. To make the notion of maintaining the capacity to 
provide non-declining well-being over time operational, economists have resorted to the 
idea of maintaining the value of total capital intact, which usually comprises 
manufactured capital, human capital, natural capital and sometimes social capital. 
Manufactured capital consists of factories, machineries, infrastructure and the like. 
Human capital refers to human skills and knowledge. Natural capital encompasses 
everything in nature that provides human beings with well-being, from natural resources 
to the pollution absorptive capacity of the environment. Social capital is difficult to 
define. It refers to things like the amount of trust, the extent of social networks, the 
willingness of individuals to co-operate with each other and their ‘civic engagement’ in 
social groups such as churches and unions (Putnam 1993). Even with this definition of 
sustainability, there are different conceptual paradigms of the conditions for achieving 
sustainability; specifically weak sustainability holds that natural capital is substitutable 
with other forms of capital, whereas strong sustainability rejects such substitutability and 
therefore focuses on environmental sustainability (Neumayer 2003). 
The pursuit of well-being of the current generation is easily justifiable, notwithstanding 
the fact that in reality many policy makers pursue other and often contrary objectives. The 
pursuit of sustainability can be justified by a universalist ethic in the Kantian (1785) and 
Rawlsian (1972) tradition, which treats all human beings equally independent of their 
position in time (Neumayer 2003, Anand and Sen 2000). In addition, it can also be 
justified under the notion of ‘usufruct rights’, where each generation has the right to enjoy 
the fruits of accumulated capital without depleting it (Anand and Sen 2000: 2035). 
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Section 2 provides a critical discussion of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW), which is the most prominent current example of an attempt to fully integrate 
the measurement of well-being and sustainability into one single indicator. Another 
indicator falling in this category is Osberg and Sharpe’s (2002a, 2002b) Index of 
Economic Well-Being. Such attempts encounter formidable conceptual problems, which 
render it questionable whether well-being and sustainability should or even could be 
measured with one single fully integrated indicator. Section 3 assesses various proposals 
to combine sustainability with the measurement of well-being without full integration. 
For no clear reason all these proposals have focused on adding sustainability 
considerations to the Human Development Index (HDI). None of these proposals is 
entirely convincing either because they do not really tackle the sustainability issue or 
because they conflate the conceptually different measurement of human development 
with that of sustainability similar to the fully integrated indicators. As an alternative, 
section 4 therefore proposes to use so-called Genuine Savings (GS) as a sustainability 
check for well-being indicators. We discuss the proposal in the context of the HDI, but 
stress that our proposal can be applied to any well-being indicator. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Fully integrated indicators of well-being and sustainability 
Gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP) were originally created 
as indicators of total economic output for macroeconomic stabilization policy and were 
therefore not meant to be indicators of well-being.1 On the other hand, it is certainly 
true that policy makers, the media and the public alike seem to equate GNP/GDP with 
well-being. In international comparison as well, we tend to think of the countries with a 
high GNP/GDP as not only the rich, but also the well-off countries. However, because 
income is just one of the components of well-being, GNP/GDP have long since been 
criticized as misleading and deficient indicators of well-being. Consequently, there have 
been many attempts at constructing better indicators. Since our objective is to review 
and critically assess indicators, which have combined the measurement of well-being 
with that of sustainability, we cannot discuss these efforts here. For an overview and 
references, see Hagerty et al. (2001) as well as the other papers arising from the UNU-
WIDER project on Social Development Indicators (Measuring Human Well-Being). 
Let us start with indicators, which have tried to fully integrate the measurement of 
sustainability into that of well-being. The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW), also known under the name Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), is the most 
prominent example. It stands in the tradition of earlier attempts to include sustainability 
aspects into a well-being indicator—see, for example, Nordhaus and Tobin’s (1972) 
Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW), Zolotas’ (1981) Economic Aspects of Welfare 
(EAW) and Eisner’s (1990) Total Incomes System of Accounts (TISA).2 The MEW and 
the EAW take environmental aspects into account, but only rudimentarily so. The MEW 
adjusts the welfare measure for ‘disamenities of urban life’ such as ‘pollution, litter, 
                                                 
1  The revised United Nations system of national accounts makes this very clear: ‘Neither gross nor net 
domestic product is a measure of welfare. Domestic product is an indicator of overall production 
activity’ (Commission of the European Communities—Eurostat et al. 1993: 41). 
2  See Eisner (1990) for an overview. 
 3
congestion, noise’ based on hedonic valuation studies.3 The EAW subtracts air pollution 
damage costs together with half of the estimated control costs for air and water pollution 
and the full control costs for solid wastes from the welfare measure. The TISA on the 
other hand does not include any environmental aspects into its measurement, but like 
the MEW and the EAW seeks to broaden the concept of capital and investment 
accounted for. 
Because of space limitations, we will concentrate on the ISEW/GPI, which takes a more 
comprehensive set of environmental factors into account than either the MEW or the 
EAW does. Also, these older indicators are somewhat outdated now. An ISEW/GPI has 
been constructed for Australia (Hamilton 1999), Austria (Stockhammer et al. 1997), 
Chile (Castañeda 1999), Germany (Diefenbacher 1994), Italy (Guenno and Tiezzi 
1998), the Netherlands (Rosenberg, Oegema, and Bovy 1995), Scotland (Moffatt and 
Wilson 1994), Sweden (Jackson and Stymne 1996), Thailand (Clarke and Islam 2003), 
the UK (Jackson et al. 1997) and the US (Redefining Progress 2001). The methodology 
differs slightly from study to study, but all follow the same basic concept, which is well 
captured by the example of the GPI for the US. It starts by adjusting personal 
consumption expenditures for unequal income distribution and subtracts net foreign 
lending or borrowing as well as the cost of consumer durables. It then subtracts a whole 
range of so-called social costs such as the costs of crime, traffic accidents, commuting, 
divorce, underemployment and loss of leisure time. The next group of deductions refers 
to the costs of environmental pollution such as air, water and noise pollution, 
environmental degradation such as loss of wetlands, farmlands and old-growth forests, 
and resource depletion. Two of these are by far the most important ones in this group. 
First, the costs of replacing non-renewable resource use with renewable resources under 
the assumption that the per unit costs of replacement rise by 3 per cent per annum. 
Second, the future or long-term damage costs due to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 
which are accumulated from year to year. Finally, a number of welfare-enhancing items 
are added such as the value of housework and volunteer work, the service value of 
consumer durables, public infrastructure and net capital investment. 
All studies, which have computed an ISEW/GPI come to the same basic conclusion: 
starting from around the 1970s or early 1980s, depending on the country, the ISEW/GPI 
no longer rises very much or even falls, whereas GNP/GDP continues to rise. As an 
explanation for this widening gap between ISEW/GPI and GNP/GDP, Max-Neef (1995: 
117) has put forward the so-called ‘threshold hypothesis’: ‘for every society there seems 
to be a period in which economic growth (as conventionally measured) brings about an 
improvement in the quality of life, but only up to a point—the threshold point—beyond 
which, if there is more economic growth, quality of life may begin to deteriorate’. This 
‘threshold hypothesis’ is referred to in almost every recent ISEW/GPI study and Max-
Neef (1995: 117) himself regarded the evidence from these studies ‘a fine illustration of 
the Threshold Hypothesis’. 
The ISEW/GPI has been criticized on many accounts—see, for example, Nordhaus 
(1992), several authors in Cobb and Cobb (1994), Crafts (2002), Neumayer (1999, 
2000, 2003, 2004). The two components, which have encountered the greatest critique, 
are resource depletion and long-term environmental damage. On resources, critics have 
                                                 
3  Such studies derive the value from environmental disamenities in comparing, for example, house 
prices from real estate, which is similar in all respects but the environmental disamenity. 
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argued that the replacement method overestimates the true loss of resource value with a 
bias that grows bigger over time due to the erroneous assumption of increasing per unit 
costs of replacing non-renewable resources. If anything, the costs of renewable 
resources such as wind and solar energy are falling rather than rising over time. In 
addition, the implicit assumption that the full amount of current non-renewable resource 
use needs to be replaced by renewable resources is also questionable given that there is 
no imminent danger of a running out of most non-renewable resources. On long-term 
environmental damage costs, its accumulation over time has been contested as flawed 
due to multiple counting. The damage costs for carbon dioxide emissions already cover 
the full future damage cost discounted to present-value terms such that accumulation 
would count the same damage over and over again—see Neumayer (2000a, 2003, 2004) 
for details. 
Some of the problems of the ISEW/GPI are avoided in Osberg and Sharpe’s (2002a, 
2002b) Index of Economic Well-Being. For example, they include a value for increases 
in life expectancy over time, which is ignored in ISEW/GPI (Crafts 2002). They also 
value leisure time and do not count human capital investment as regrettable or defensive 
expenditures as the ISEW/GPI does for 50 per cent of education expenditures. They do 
not commit the fallacy of multiple counting of long-term environmental damage in the 
form of carbon dioxide emissions. On the other hand, their environmental component is 
rather weak with resource consumption not included at all and carbon dioxide is the 
only pollutant accounted for. 
As fully integrated indicators of well-being and sustainability both the ISEW/GPI and 
Osberg and Sharpe’s Index of Economic Well-Being encounter another fundamental 
problem, on which we will concentrate here. The problem is that for measurement 
purposes one should not attempt to fully integrate well-being and sustainability into one 
single indicator. This is because what affects current well-being need not affect 
sustainability and vice versa—either not at all or at least not in the same way. This 
seems counter-intuitive given the conceptual links between well-being and 
sustainability. However, current well-being is affected by the way in which current total 
capital is used. Sustainability is only affected if the total capital stock itself is affected. 
Take the depletion of non-renewable resources and long-term environmental damage 
from carbon dioxide emissions as examples. They affect sustainability as, all other 
things equal, they diminish the value of the total capital stock available to future 
generations. They rightly form a component of a sustainability indicator. But neither 
resource depletion nor long-term environmental damage negatively affect current 
welfare. They affect future, but not current welfare. One could therefore argue that they 
should be excluded from an indicator of current welfare. Against this reasoning, one 
might argue with Osborne and Sharpe (2002a: 300) that ‘if individuals alive today care 
about the well-being of future generations, measurement of trends in current well-being 
should include considerations of changes in the well-being of generations yet unborn’. 
This is a good argument, but it depends on the assumption that changes to future well-
being really do affect the current generation’s welfare. More importantly, the argument 
cannot hold in the other direction as future generations cannot care for the welfare of the 
current generation. Hence, what affects the current generation’s welfare should not be 
included in an indicator of sustainability. There are items in the ISEW/GPI and in 
Osborne and Sharpe’s Index of Economic Well-Being, which affect current welfare, but 
are only loosely connected to sustainability, if at all. A good example for this is income 
inequality. The indicators fall if income inequality increases. Many would agree that the 
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current welfare of society is negatively affected by a more unequal distribution of 
incomes. A society with a more unequal distribution of income generates less current 
welfare out the available stock of capital than another one with the same capital stock, 
but a more equal distribution of income. Not necessarily so with sustainability, 
however. A more unequal distribution of present incomes does not in itself diminish the 
value of the total capital stock available to future generations. There could be indirect 
effects as the distribution of income can affect savings and therefore investment 
decisions, which then affects sustainability. The available evidence is not unambiguous 
(Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén 2000), but if anything evidence seems to suggest that a 
more unequal distribution of income can be in the interest of the future because rich 
people have a higher marginal propensity to save than poor people (Smith 2001).4 
Hence, more income inequality can lower current welfare, but enhance sustainability. 
The co-existence of factors within one integrated indicator of welfare and sustainability, 
which affect one, but not the other (or only weakly and ambiguously so), means that as 
the indicator rises or falls we do not know what rises or falls. A rising indicator could 
mean rising welfare and sustainability, rising welfare and a decline in sustainability 
(that is less in value terms than the rise in welfare) or falling welfare and a rise in 
sustainability (that is more in value terms than the fall in welfare). Which one is not 
clear. The lesson is that one needs two separate indicators to trace two distinct concepts. 
3 Indicators combining well-being and sustainability without full integration 
Let us therefore turn to efforts at combining the measurement of well-being with that of 
sustainability without trying to integrate both into one single indicator. These efforts 
have concentrated on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI), first published in 1990, which is also the perhaps most 
prominent and best known indicator of well-being. The exact methodology of the HDI 
has changed somewhat throughout time. Without going into detail, the HDI is currently 
computed as follows: It is made up of three equally weighted components, the income, 
the education and the health/longevity component. For the first two components a 
transformed variable is derived from basic data. For the income component a log 
transformation is applied, in effect discounting higher incomes due to supposed 
diminishing marginal utility. For the educational component the transformed variable 
consists of two thirds of the percentage rate of literate adults among all adults and one 
third of the combined first-, second- and third-level educational gross enrollment ratio 
in percentage. The health/longevity component is directly measured by life expectancy 
at birth in years. For each variable a maximum and a minimum is defined. An index is 
then calculated as follows: 
 
                                                 
4  Anand and Sen (2000: 2038) also point out that redistribution to the poor in the form of better 
nutrition, health and education rather than income is likely to contribute to sustainability 
unambiguously. We agree, but the mere re-distribution of income need not be sustainability 
promoting. 
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(actual value -  minimum value) X_index = 
(maximum value -  minimum value)
, 
X = (Income, Longevity, Education)  
This index is calculated for each variable. A country’s HDI is then simply the arithmetic 
average of its three indexes: 
1HDI = ×(Income_index + Longevity_index + Education_index)
3
 
The validity of the HDI as an indicator of well-being has been disputed in many 
respects—see, for example, McGillivray (1993), Hicks (1997), Noorbaksh (1998a, 
1998b), Sagar and Najam (1998). We will not discuss the criticism it has encountered as 
other papers in the UNU-WIDER project pursue this task. Instead, we will concentrate 
on our major objective, which is to examine how indicators of well-being and 
sustainability have been combined with each other. 
3.1 Sustainability extensions to the HDI 
There have been many proposals on how the HDI could be amended to take 
environmental aspects or sustainability into account. First, Desai (1995) has developed 
an ‘index of intensity of environmental exploitation’, which ranks countries similar to 
the HDI methodology according to a composite index comprising greenhouse gas 
emissions per capita, water withdrawal as per cent of annual internal renewable water 
resources and energy consumption per unit of GNP. Desai does not, however, attempt to 
integrate this index into the HDI itself.  
Second, Dahme et al. (1998) have proposed to rank countries according to their total 
material requirements and to use this data to construct an extension to the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI), called 
‘Sustainable Human Development Index’ (SHDI). Total material requirement refers to 
the sum of all material inputs required to produce a country’s national economic output. 
All material inputs are grouped into abiotic raw materials (mineral and energy 
resources), biotic raw materials, moved soil (agriculture and forestry), water and air and 
are aggregated in weight terms. 
Third, Sagar and Najam (1996: 14) suggest that an increase in income per capita ‘above 
a selected threshold—selected to represent a point that allows a reasonably high 
standard of living but beyond which consumption pressures on the environment start 
becoming excessive—the standard-of-living index should reflect this unsustainable 
lifestyle through a penalization on the index’. The resulting ‘index of sustainable living’ 
would go some way towards a SHDI according to its proponents. 
Fourth, De la Vega and Urrutia (2001) have proposed to adjust the HDI’s income 
component to reflect the environmental damage caused in generating the income. Their 
proposal focuses on carbon dioxide since it is the only pollutant for which 
comprehensive cross-country and over time data exist. Setting 60 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emitted per capita as the maximum and zero as the minimum, they compute an 
‘environmental behaviour indicator’ (EBI) according to the formula EBI = 1 – CO2/60. 
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The harmonic mean of the EBI and the HDI’s income component forms the so-called 
pollution-sensitive income component. This pollution-sensitive income component is 
then used in the usual way as one of the three unweighted components together with the 
longevity and education component to create a so-called pollution-sensitive HDI. 
The fifth proposal by Ramanathan (1999) is close to the HDI methodology in setting 
maximum and minimum values for an index of deforestation, an index of the number of 
rare, endangered or threatened species, a greenhouse gas emissions and a 
chlorofluorocarbon emissions index, which are combined to an overall environment 
endangerment index (EEI). This aggregate EEI is then used to calculate a so-called 
Environment Sensitive HDI as the product of the HDI and the EEI. He does not, 
however, attempt to compute such an Environment Sensitive HDI. 
3.2 A critical assessment of the proposed extensions 
All these proposals encounter substantial problems and criticism. Desai’s (1995) 
proposal refers to rather incomplete and partly irrelevant aspects of environmental 
pollution. For example, how much water a country withdraws as a per cent of annual 
internal renewable water resources is substantially determined by geological and 
climatic conditions and a higher percentage of use is not necessarily worse than a low 
percentage. Similarly, energy consumption per unit of GNP is just an efficiency 
measure. Carbon dioxide emissions are certainly relevant, but they capture just one 
aspect of environmental pollution. Also, to rank countries according to their carbon 
dioxide emissions does not tell us anything about the actual environmental damage 
caused or its unsustainability. Furthermore, Qizilbash (2001) demonstrates that the 
ranking of countries is very sensitive to the choice of environmental factors looked at. If 
other environmental factors are included such as commercial and traditional fuel 
consumption per capita (instead of per unit of GNP), water resource consumption per 
capita (instead of as a percentage of annual internal reserves) and forest and woodland 
change, then the ranking is quite different from the one arrived at by Desai (1995). 
De la Vega and Urrutia’s (2001) pollution-sensitive HDI is similar to Desai’s proposal 
in focusing on carbon dioxide emissions, but it attempts to integrate the pollution index 
into the income component. Again, no attempt at valuation is undertaken. Their 
proposal suffers from a major setback, however. Countries with very high per capita 
emissions such as some of the Middle East oil producing countries, Luxembourg, 
Australia, Norway and the US move down in the pollution-sensitive HDI ranking and 
vice versa for countries with very low emissions. This would erroneously suggest that 
the achieved human development of these countries is lower than the original HDI 
indicated. However, this is not the case. Instead, very high per capita carbon dioxide 
emissions merely signal that the high human development of these countries is bought 
at the expense of carbon dioxide emissions that would be unsustainable on a global 
scale as it would cause drastic climate change. Never mind that this is no new 
information, but something we knew all the time. More importantly, given that this is 
the true information content, the HDI itself should be unaffected since human 
development is unaffected. Again, as with the case of the ISEW/GPI and Osberg and 
Sharpe’s (2002a, 2002b) Index of Economic Well-Being, the conflation of factors 
relevant for current well-being with those of sustainability leads to a flawed overall 
indicator that can no longer measure correctly either current well-being or sustainability. 
Ramanathan’s (1999) proposal encounters the very same critique. 
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Dahme et al.’s (1998) proposal is very removed from actual environmental damage. 
From an environmental point of view, two forms of material flows with differing 
environmental damage impacts cannot be added together just because one can express 
both in weight terms. Without further analysis of what the material flows consist of and 
what are its environmental implications, it is pointless to simply rank countries 
according to the size of their material flows (for a more detailed critique of material 
flows as a measure of sustainability, see Neumayer (2003, 2004)). 
More fundamentally, neither of these proposals directly addresses the sustainability 
problem. A ranking of countries according to environmental factors or material flows 
does not tell us anything about their sustainability, not even if we focus on 
environmental sustainability only. Sagar and Najam’s (1996) proposal is also too 
simplistic. There does not exist a threshold of income, after which further income 
increases are unsustainable due to ‘excessive consumption’. Without further knowledge 
about the environmental impact of the consumption level, one cannot infer whether it is 
sustainable or not. Also, none of the proposals discussed so far deals seriously with 
resource depletion, even though resource depletion forms an important component of 
the depreciation of the natural capital stock. 
4 An alternative proposal: assessing the sustainability of well-being with 
Genuine Savings 
As an alternative to fully integrated indicators of sustainability and well-being and as an 
alternative to the suggested extensions to the HDI discussed in the last section, 
Neumayer (2000a) has proposed to combine the HDI with a measurement of 
sustainability that can signal if the achieved level of human development can be 
maintained into the future. The measurement of sustainability is that of so-called 
Genuine Savings (GS), which measures the total investment in all forms of capital 
minus the total depreciation of all forms of capital. In simple terms, if GS is negative, 
then the value of the total capital stock available to future generations is smaller than the 
one available to the current generation—a clear indication of unsustainability (Pezzey 
and Toman 2002). Hence, Neumayer (2000a) proposes to qualify a country’s HDI as 
unsustainable if the country’s GS rate is below zero. Note, however, that the proposal 
can in principle be applied to any indicator of well-being, not just the HDI. 
Genuine Savings has been pioneered by Hamilton (1994, 1996) with the World Bank’s 
Environment Department. The World Bank publishes GS data in its annual statistical 
compendium World Development Indicators under the name ‘adjusted savings’.5 
Within its GS computations, the World Bank takes depletion of the following natural 
resources into account in computing natural capital stock depreciation: oil, natural gas, 
hard coal, brown coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, zinc, phosphate, tin, gold, 
silver, and forests. As can be seen, the measure is strong on non-renewable resources 
since for these marketed resources the necessary data for valuation are not too difficult 
to get hold of. The harvesting of forests is the only renewable resource taken into 
account so far, others such as water depletion, fish catch, biodiversity loss, soil erosion 
                                                 
5  Like Dasgupta (2001a, 2001b) I prefer the term genuine investment as investment is really what GS 
refers to. However, Genuine Savings has now become the established nomenclature. 
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and the like encounter formidable data problems. The same is true for environmental 
pollution, for which carbon dioxide is currently the only pollutant included. 
The World Bank counts current education expenditures as a proxy for investment into 
human capital. This is certainly rather crude, but it is difficult to see how investment in 
human capital could be estimated otherwise for so many countries over such a long time 
horizon.6 Dasgupta (2001b: C9f.) argues that it is an overestimate since human capital is 
lost when people die. Against this one might object that part of the human capital might 
have been passed on so that the human capital is not really lost once individuals die or, 
to be precise, leave the workforce. In any case, such correction would be difficult to 
undertake. 
Table 1 lists the HDI of countries in five-year steps from 1975 to 2000 and qualifies the 
achieved level of human development as potentially unsustainable if the country’s GS 
was negative in or around that year. Note that for a number of technical reasons the 
qualification is one of potential unsustainability rather than outright unsustainability. 
First, given the sometimes shaky quality of the data one must be cautious about making 
strong assertions. Second, the World Bank counts the full value of resource depletion as 
natural capital depreciation ([price – average cost] * quantity of resource extracted or 
harvested). As argued in detail in Neumayer (2000a, 2003) the World Bank’s 
computation of the full value of natural resource extraction might overestimate natural 
capital depreciation. What has become known as the El Serafy method (El Serafy 1981, 
1989) corrects this upward bias, but it requires information about reserve stocks, which 
are not available for many countries for many resources for many years. Our 
computations therefore by necessity apply the World Bank method. 
 
Table 1. HDI with Genuine Savings qualification 
Rank Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
High human development  
1 Norway 0.859 0.877 0.888 0.901 0.925 0.942
2 Sweden 0.863 0.872 0.883 0.894 0.925 0.941
3 Canada 0.868 0.883 0.906 0.926 0.932 0.940
4 Belgium 0.844 0.861 0.875 0.896 0.927 0.939
5 Australia 0.844 0.861 0.873 0.888 0.927 0.939
6 United States 0.863 0.884 0.898 0.914 0.925 0.939
7 Iceland 0.863 0.885 0.894 0.913 0.918 0.936
8 Netherlands 0.861 0.873 0.888 0.902 0.922 0.935
9 Japan 0.854 0.878 0.893 0.909 0.923 0.933
10 Finland 0.836 0.856 0.873 0.896 0.908 0.930
11 Switzerland 0.874 0.886 0.892 0.905 0.914 0.928
12 France 0.848 0.863 0.875 0.897 0.914 0.928
13 United Kingdom 0.841 0.848 0.858 0.878 0.916 0.928
14 Denmark 0.868 0.876 0.883 0.891 0.907 0.926
                                                 
6  Note that in the traditional national accounts capital expenditures on education are already counted 
towards investment in man-made capital. 
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15 Austria 0.840 0.854 0.867 0.890 0.909 0.926 
16 Luxembourg 0.831 0.846 0.860 0.884 0.912 0.925 
17 Germany n.a. 0.859 0.868 0.885 0.907 0.925 
18 Ireland 0.818 0.831 0.846 0.870 0.894 0.925 
19 New Zealand 0.849 0.855 0.866 0.875 0.902 0.917 
20 Italy 0.828 0.846 0.856 0.879 0.897 0.913 
21 Spain 0.819 0.838 0.855 0.876 0.895 0.913 
22 Israel 0.790 0.814 0.836 0.855 0.877 0.896 
23 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.756 0.795 0.823 0.859 0.877 0.888 
24 Greece 0.808 0.829 0.845 0.859 0.868 0.885 
25 Singapore 0.722 0.755 0.782 0.818 0.857 0.885 
26 Cyprus n.a. 0.801 0.821 0.845 0.866 0.883 
27 Korea, Rep. of 0.691 0.732 0.774 0.815 0.852 0.882 
28 Portugal 0.737 0.760 0.787 0.819 0.855 0.880 
29 Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.845 0.852 0.879 
30 Malta 0.731 0.766 0.793 0.826 0.850 0.875 
31 Barbados n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.871 
32 Brunei Darussalam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
33 Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.843 0.849 
34 Argentina 0.785 0.799 0.805 0.808 0.830 0.844 
35 Hungary 0.777 0.793 0.805 0.804 0.809 0.835 
36 Slovakia n.a. n.a. 0.813 0.820 0.817 0.835 
37 Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.792 0.808 0.833 
38 Chile 0.702 0.737 0.754 0.782 0.811 0.831 
39 Bahrain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.831 
40 Uruguay 0.757 0.777 0.781 0.801 0.815 0.831 
41 Bahamas n.a. 0.805 0.817 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
42 Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.826 
43 Costa Rica 0.745 0.769 0.770 0.787 0.805 0.820 
44 Saint Kitts and Nevis n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.814 
45 Kuwait 0.753 0.773 0.777 n.a. 0.812 0.813 
46 United Arab Emirates n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
47 Seychelles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
48 Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
49 Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.816 0.781 0.808 
50 Trinidad and Tobago 0.722 0.755 0.774 0.781 0.787 0.805 
51 Qatar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.803 
52 Antigua and Barbuda n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.800 
53 Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.804 0.763 0.800 
    
Medium human development   
54 Mexico n.a. 0.734 0.752 0.761 0.774 0.796 
55 Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
56 Belarus n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.809 0.776 0.788 
57 Panama n.a. 0.731 0.745 0.747 0.770 0.787 
58 Belize n.a. 0.710 0.718 0.750 0.772 0.784 
59 Malaysia 0.616 0.659 0.693 0.722 0.760 0.782 
60 Russian Federation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.779 0.781 
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61 Dominica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
62 Bulgaria n.a. 0.763 0.784 0.786 0.778 0.779
63 Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.777 0.772 0.775
64 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.773
65 Macedonia, TFYR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
66 Saint Lucia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.772
67 Mauritius 0.630 0.656 0.686 0.723 0.746 0.772
68 Colombia 0.660 0.690 0.704 0.724 0.750 0.772
69 Venezuela 0.716 0.731 0.738 0.757 0.766 0.770
70 Thailand 0.604 0.645 0.676 0.713 0.749 0.762
71 Saudi Arabia 0.587 0.646 0.670 0.706 0.737 0.759
72 Fiji 0.660 0.683 0.697 0.723 0.743 0.758
73 Brazil 0.644 0.679 0.692 0.713 0.737 0.757
74 Suriname n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.756
75 Lebanon n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.680 0.730 0.755
76 Armenia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.754
77 Philippines n.a. 0.684 0.688 0.716 0.733 0.754
78 Oman n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
79 Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.750
80 Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.748
81 Georgia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.748
82 Peru n.a. 0.669 0.692 0.704 0.730 0.747
83 Grenada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.747
84 Maldives n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.707 0.743
85 Turkey 0.593 0.617 0.654 0.686 0.717 0.742
86 Jamaica 0.687 0.690 0.692 0.720 0.736 0.742
87 Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
88 Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.741
89 Sri Lanka 0.616 0.650 0.676 0.697 0.719 0.741
90 Paraguay 0.665 0.699 0.705 0.717 0.735 0.740
91 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.733
92 Albania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.702 0.733
93 Ecuador n.a. 0.673 0.694 0.705 0.719 0.732
94 Dominican Republic 0.617 0.646 0.667 0.677 0.698 0.727
95 Uzbekistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.714 0.727
96 China n.a. n.a. 0.591 0.625 0.681 0.726
97 Tunisia 0.514 0.566 0.613 0.646 0.682 0.722
98 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.556 0.563 0.607 0.645 0.688 0.721
99 Jordan n.a. 0.636 0.658 0.677 0.703 0.717
100 Cape Verde n.a. n.a. 0.587 0.626 0.678 0.715
101 Samoa (Western) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
102 Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.712
103 Guyana n.a. 0.679 0.671 n.a. 0.703 n.a.
104 El Salvador 0.586 0.586 0.606 0.644 0.682 0.706
105 Moldova, Rep. of n.a. 0.720 0.741 0.759 0.704 0.701
106 Algeria n.a. 0.550 0.600 0.639 n.a. n.a.
107 South Africa n.a. 0.663 0.683 0.714 0.724 0.695
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108 Syrian Arab Republic 0.538 0.580 0.614 0.634 0.665 0.691 
109 Viet Nam n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.605 0.649 0.688 
110 Indonesia n.a. n.a. 0.582 0.623 0.664 0.684 
111 Equatorial Guinea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
112 Tajikistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.669 0.667 
113 Mongolia n.a. n.a. 0.650 0.657 0.636 0.655 
114 Bolivia n.a. 0.548 0.573 0.597 0.630 0.653 
115 Egypt 0.435 0.482 0.532 0.574 0.605 0.642 
116 Honduras 0.518 0.566 0.597 0.615 0.628 0.638 
117 Gabon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.637 
118 Nicaragua n.a. 0.576 0.584 0.592 0.615 0.635 
119 Sao Tome and Principe n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
120 Guatemala 0.506 0.543 0.555 0.579 0.609 0.631 
121 Solomon Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
122 Namibia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.610 
123 Morocco 0.429 0.474 0.508 0.540 0.569 0.602 
124 India 0.407 0.434 0.473 0.511 0.545 0.577 
125 Swaziland 0.512 0.543 0.569 0.615 0.620 0.577 
126 Botswana 0.494 0.556 0.613 0.653 0.620 0.572 
127 Myanmar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
128 Zimbabwe n.a. 0.572 0.621 0.597 0.563 n.a. 
129 Ghana 0.438 0.468 0.481 0.506 0.525 0.548 
130 Cambodia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.531 0.543 
131 Vanuatu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
132 Lesotho n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
133 Papua New Guinea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
134 Kenya 0.443 0.489 0.512 0.533 0.523 0.513 
135 Cameroon 0.410 0.455 0.505 0.513 0.499 0.512 
136 Congo 0.417 0.467 0.517 0.510 0.511 n.a. 
137 Comoros n.a. 0.480 0.498 0.502 0.506 n.a. 
    
Low human development   
138 Pakistan 0.345 0.372 0.404 0.442 0.473 0.499 
139 Sudan 0.346 0.374 n.a. n.a. 0.462 0.499 
140 Bhutan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.494 
141 Togo 0.394 0.443 0.440 0.465 0.476 0.493 
142 Nepal 0.289 0.328 0.370 0.416 0.453 0.490 
143 Lao People's Dem. Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.485 
144 Yemen n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.399 0.439 0.479 
145 Bangladesh 0.335 0.353 0.386 0.416 0.445 0.478 
146 Haiti n.a. 0.430 0.445 0.447 0.457 0.471 
147 Madagascar 0.399 0.433 0.427 0.434 0.441 0.469 
148 Nigeria 0.328 0.388 0.403 0.425 0.448 0.462 
149 Djibouti n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
150 Uganda n.a. n.a. 0.386 0.388 0.404 0.444 
151 Tanzania, U. Rep. of n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.422 0.427 0.440 
152 Mauritania 0.337 0.360 0.379 0.390 0.418 0.438 
153 Zambia n.a. 0.463 0.480 0.468 n.a. n.a. 
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154 Senegal 0.313 0.330 0.356 0.380 0.400 0.431
155 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.431
156 Côte d'Ivoire 0.369 0.403 0.412 0.415 0.416 0.428
157 Eritrea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
158 Benin 0.288 0.324 0.350 0.358 0.388 0.420
159 Guinea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.414
160 Gambia 0.272 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.375 0.405
161 Angola n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.403
162 Rwanda 0.336 0.380 0.396 0.346 0.335 0.403
163 Malawi 0.316 0.341 0.354 0.362 0.403 0.400
164 Mali 0.252 0.279 0.292 0.312 0.346 0.386
165 Central African Republic n.a. 0.351 0.371 0.372 0.369 0.375
166 Chad n.a. n.a. 0.298 0.322 0.335 0.365
167 Guinea-Bissau n.a. n.a. 0.283 0.304 0.331 0.349
168 Ethiopia n.a. n.a. 0.275 0.297 0.308 0.327
169 Burkina Faso 0.232 0.259 0.282 0.290 0.300 0.325
170 Mozambique n.a. 0.302 0.290 0.310 0.313 0.322
171 Burundi n.a. n.a. 0.338 0.344 0.316 0.313
172 Niger 0.234 0.254 0.246 0.256 0.262 0.277
173 Sierra Leone n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 
Note: Numbers in bold represent negative GS rates. 
n.a. means that either the HDI or GS is not available. 
Source: UNDP (2002) and World Bank (2002). 
 
Table 1 shows that most countries with high human development are not detected as 
weakly unsustainable. This is because investments into human and man-made capital far 
outweigh depreciation of capital. It is only such countries as Kuwait and Trinidad and 
Tobago with a strong dependence on natural resource extraction, which have negative 
GS rates. Most countries whose human development achievement needs to be qualified 
due to negative GS rates are those with low human development or in the lower part of 
medium human development. Another observation following from Table 1 is that 
unsustainability is persistent in the sense that often countries with negative GS in one 
year have similarly negative rates in other years as well. Unsustainability is not 
inescapable, however, as such examples as Chile and Jamaica show, which started off 
with negative GS, but turned these into positive rates in the 1990s. In the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa, from which many countries with signs of unsustainability come from, a 
more detailed analysis shows that even their net savings, that is before natural capital 
depreciation, is often already negative such that their economies are on a weakly 
unsustainable path quite independently of depreciation due to natural resource 
exploitation (Neumayer 2004). 
One of the problems of the existing published GS data is that it does not take into 
account population growth. One might think that this is easy to achieve in looking at GS 
per capita instead of GS. However, the correct accounting for population growth 
depends on whether population growth is assumed to be exponential and whether social 
welfare only depends on per capita utility or also on population size (see Hamilton 
2002, Asheim 2002, Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler 2003). If one were to take GS per 
capita as a first approximation, then many more developing countries with fast growing 
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populations would run into problems with weak sustainability. Dasgupta (2001a: 158) 
computes that Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and the Sub-Saharan African region 
as a whole have all had net per capita depreciation of their total capital stock over the 
period 1970 to 1993. China, the only other country looked at by Dasgupta, has just so 
escaped this fate. Note, however, that technological progress is a force in the opposite 
direction. If it is at least partly exogenous in the sense that it is not fully captured by 
total capital (Weitzman 1997), then even negative GS rates at any moment of time need 
not imply weak unsustainability. The same is true for what Dasgupta (2001a: 149) calls 
‘costless accumulation of public knowledge’. We cannot resolve these difficult issues 
and simply take existing published GS data as a first approximation. 
What are the policy implications of our analysis? Countries with negative GS rates need 
to invest more and consume less to achieve sustainability. There is a fundamental 
problem with this policy implication, however. We saw already that developing 
countries with low and lower medium human development form the majority of 
countries with unsustainable human development. To demand from these poor countries 
to save more and consume less is likely to impose the burden of sustainability 
achievement on the shoulders of poor, powerless and vulnerable people. This, however, 
would contradict the universalist foundation of sustainability, as Anand and Sen (2000: 
2030) make clear: 
universalism also requires that in our anxiety to protect the future 
generations, we must not overlook the pressing claims of the less 
privileged today. A universalist approach cannot ignore the deprived 
people today in trying to prevent deprivation in the future. 
Without help from the intra-generationally rich (i.e. the developed countries), these 
countries will not only be unable to improve their welfare, but they also risk losing the 
little welfare they have since even this low level is unsustainable. Such help in the form 
of aid, trade or investment can be justified partly with recourse to the fact that 
development in rich countries has partly been achieved via imposing a negative 
externality in the form of greenhouse gas emissions, the costs of which are mainly borne 
by future developing countries (Neumayer 2000b). 
5 Conclusion 
We have argued that besides methodological flaws that are specific to the ISEW/GPI, 
fully integrated indicators of well-being and sustainability encounter a fundamental 
conceptual problem: What affects current well-being need not affect sustainability at all 
or not in the same way, and vice versa. Fully integrated indicators therefore tend to 
conflate the measurement of two items that should be kept conceptually different. 
Whereas well-being refers to the current use of the available capital stock in terms of 
preference satisfaction, sustainability refers to sustaining the value of the total capital 
stock for the future. The inclusion of sustainability in a measure of current well-being 
can be justified if one assumes that the current generation’s welfare fully takes the 
welfare of future generations into account. However, no similar justification exists for a 
measure of sustainability, which should be free of items that affect only current well-
being as future generations cannot care for current welfare. 
 15
As we have seen, even some proposals combining the measurement of well-being with 
that of sustainability without full integration at times fall into this trap. We have 
therefore developed a proposal, which combines the measurement of well-being with 
that of sustainability that avoids the trap. Well-being is measured in the conventional 
way, but the sustainability of the achieved level of well-being is checked with a GS test. 
Where GS is below zero, there is a danger that the achieved level of well-being is 
bought at the expense of liquidating the total capital available to a country, which 
cannot be sustainable. We have illustrated our proposal with reference to the HDI, but 
hasten to add that it is a general proposal in that the GS test can be added to any 
indicator of well-being. 
Of course, our proposal to combine the HDI with a sustainability check according to the 
GS rule is not without its problems and limitations either. Currently, GS is not 
computed for all countries for which UNDP calculates a HDI, but using GS as a 
sustainability qualification only makes sense if it is available for all relevant countries. 
Coverage is also a problem with respect to the extent to which natural capital is fully 
taken into account. Ideally more renewable resource depletion such as water, soil and 
fish should be included. The same goes for pollutants such as sulphur and nitrogen 
dioxides, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds and many more. That 
developed countries are not regarded as unsustainable according to GS is partly due to 
their high investment into manufactured and human capital. However, if more pollutants 
could be taken into account their sustainability position would no longer be as 
favourable as it currently is. This is because as UNDP (1998: 66) correctly points out: 
‘It is the rich who pollute more … who generate more waste and put more stress on 
nature’s sink’. Of course, it is doubtful whether we will ever have such data available 
for all countries. However, for the developed countries better and more comprehensive 
data exist and there is no reason why a more comprehensive GS measure could not be 
estimated for this group of countries. 
The main reason why developed countries are not detected as unsustainable by GS has 
to do with the concept of sustainability underlying the measure, however. This concept 
is one of weak sustainability, which, as pointed out in the introduction, assumes 
substitutability of natural capital through other forms of capital. The competing concept 
of strong sustainability rejects such substitutability. It requires to keep pollution within 
the absorptive capacity of nature and to replace depleted non-renewable resources with 
a functionally equivalent stock of renewable resources or non-depletable resources 
(such as solar and wind energy) (Neumayer 2003). Why not combine the HDI with a 
measure of strong sustainability then? The reason is that there are likely to be very few, 
if any, countries that achieve strong sustainability. Most developed countries emit more 
greenhouse gases than the atmosphere can cope with. Those developing countries that 
do not exceed the natural absorptive capacity of the global atmosphere with their 
greenhouse gas emissions still often deplete their non-renewable resource stock without 
adequate replacement investments into renewable or non-depletable resources or 
degrade their local environment. The information content of such a measure would 
therefore be minimal. The lesson is to take GS as a first step into the right direction. A 
country, which is not weakly sustainable cannot be strongly sustainable either and since 
there are so many poor weakly unsustainable countries in the developing world, making 
them weakly sustainable is what we should concentrate on. 
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